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What is the meaning and content of the "liberty" protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment? In Michael H.
v. Gerald D.,1 Justices Brennan and Scalia spelled out what at first
blush appear to be sharply contrasting understandings of the
meaning of liberty and of the substantive limits liberty imposes on
state action.2 Justice Scalia argued that the "liberty" protected by
a substantive interpretation of due process is only the liberty to
engage in activities historically protected against state intervention
by firmly entrenched societal traditions. I will sometimes call this
the "traditionalist" interpretation of liberty. Justice Brennan, by
contrast, argued for a much broader, and nominally more liberal,
interpretation. The liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment,
Brennan contended, means the liberty to enjoy those broad areas of
life-such as parenthood, privacy, and sexuality-which have been
identified as essential to liberty by the relevantjudicial precedent of
the liberal Warren and Burger Court era. I will sometimes call this
the "precedential" interpretation.
In this essay I will briefly argue that, appearances notwithstand-
ing, Justice Brennan's precedential interpretation of liberty, no less
than Justice Scalia's traditionalist one, is at its root deeply conserva-
tive. I will then argue that the best explanation for the conservatism
of even this nominally "liberal" interpretation of liberty by an
unquestionably liberal jurist is that it stems from the general need
of all members of the Court-liberal as well as conservative-to
interpret the Constitution in a way that vindicates the "jurispruden-
tial virtues" of good judicial decision-making. Those virtues, I will
suggest, are themselves conservative, and perhaps necessarily so. It
is therefore not surprising that constitutional interpretations
rendered by even the liberal Justices-such as Justice Brennan's
interpretation of "liberty" in Michael H.-have conservative overtones
and consequences.
Second, I will suggest that the Justices' collective need to
constrain interpretation by the ethical demands of the adjudicative,
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1 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
2 See id. at 2341-46 (Scalia, J.); id. at 2349-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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virtues has cramped our understanding of liberty, as well as of the
Constitution's other general phrases. We ought to liberate the
interpretive questions-what is liberty, and what constraints does it
impose on state action-from their historical associations with the
ethical need to constrain judicial decision-making. By doing so, we
might achieve a more progressive, but also more accurate, under-
standing of the nature of individual liberty than that propounded by
eitherJustice Brennan orJustice Scalia in their respective decisions
in Michael H.
In his plurality opinion in Michael H., Justice Scalia argued,
partly in a footnote in which only one member of the Court
joined,3 that the "liberty" protected by substantive due process
must be understood as including only the liberty to engage in
activities or forms of life which have been "traditionally" protected
against communal sanction, state action, or majoritarian control.4
The requisite "tradition" in this formulation, Scalia went on to
argue, must be interpreted as narrowly as is sensibly possible.5 He
then argued that the "liberty" interest which Michael H. sought to
enforce-the liberty of an "adulterous biological father" to maintain
a relationship with his biological daughter, when the child's mother
is married to another man-has not been protected by any specific,
narrowly tailored, societal tradition. Therefore, Scalia concluded,
the California statute establishing a conclusive presumption in favor
of the paternity of the mother's husband did not unconstitutionally
deny the biological father his liberty. 6 Even assuming that we have
traditionally protected "parenthood," Scalia argued, we have not
traditionally protected the parental liberties of an adulterous father
over his daughter born to a mother who is married to another man,
and accordingly the statute establishing the conclusive presumption
in favor of the "marital" father violates no constitutional stricture.
7
Regardless of the merits of Michael H. itself, it seems fair to say,
as Justice Brennan argued in dissent, that the interpretation of
liberty and hence of substantive due process espoused by Justice
Scalia in Michael H. is so narrow that if embraced by the Court it
would lead to the effective end of the doctrine.8 The claim that
3 See id. at 2344 n.6 (joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
4 See id. at 2341-46.
5 See id. at 2344 n.6 (referring to "the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition... can be identified").
6 See id. at 2341-46.
7 See id. at 2344.
8 See id. at 2350-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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there exists a narrow, specific tradition protecting a liberty which is
threatened by a challenged statute is fatally undermined by the
existence of the statute itself. Obviously, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to argue that Californians have a "tradition" protecting
the rights of adulterous biological fathers when they have a statute
granting a conclusive presumption of paternity to the husband of
the child's mother. Furthermore, Scalia's position, if accepted,
would undermine not only Michael H. but also virtually every major
substantive due process case of the last twenty years.9 For it is
surely hard, if not impossible, to argue that we have a "tradition"
protecting the rights of women to procure abortions, in the face of
multiple statutes criminalizing abortion. It is hard to argue that we
have a tradition protecting the sexual autonomy or privacy of homo-
sexuals, in the face of sodomy laws. It is hard to argue that we have
a tradition protecting the rights of patients in vegetative states to
die with dignity free of technological intervention, in the face of
numerous state statutes heavily qualifying that freedom. Indeed, it
is hard to argue, even, that we have a tradition protecting the rights
of married persons to use contraceptives in the face of statutes
criminalizing their distribution.10 If Scalia is right to insist that
the content of the "liberty" that limits the substantive scope of the
police power must come from societal traditions, and right to insist
that those traditions must be narrowly construed, then it seems fair
to conclude that there is, in practical effect, no such limit. The
police power of the states is substantively limited only by other
express constitutional provisions, not by the content of the "liberty"
guaranteed against invasion without "due process" in the fourteenth
amendment.
At least at first blush, Justice Brennan's understanding of due
process and the liberty it protects, spelled out in his dissenting
opinion in Michael H., 11 sharply contrasts with, and is considerably
9 On this ground, Justice O'Connor objected to Scalia's formulation of due
process clause analysis. She thus refused to concur in the footnote in which he made
the argument. See id. at 2346-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10 Under Scalia's test, the following cases all seem incorrectly decided: Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (upholding right to die); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding right to an abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding right of married persons to use
contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (upholding right of
unmarried individuals to use contraception). On the other hand, his test seems
consistent with the decision in Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (denying right
to engage in consensual sodomy).
"1 109 S. Ct. at 2349-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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more expansive than, Scalia's understanding. The existence of a
specific, firmly entrenched societal tradition, Brennan argued,
cannot be the necessary condition for the existence of a liberty
protected against state action. To do so would be to render the
clause a "redundancy": any liberty specifically enshrined in
tradition will not be undercut by state law.1 2 The existence of a
"tradition" is indeed relevant to the existence of a "liberty"
protected against societal -overreach, Brennan conceded, but the
tradition must be understood generally, not specifically.13 Fur-
thermore, and perhaps more importantly, the source of the
tradition is not "society," but Supreme Court precedent. The
liberties protected by due process are those general traditions that
the Court has identified precedentially: parenthood, intimacy,
reproduction, contraception, sexuality, and the like.1 4  Thus,
under Brennan's approach, there is indeed a tradition protecting
the sort of liberty Michael H. was seeking to enforce: "we,"
meaning the liberal Warren-Burger Court, have "traditionally"
upheld the rights of unwed fathers to maintain relationships with
their children.1 5 That tradition is not negatived, but violated, by
a state statute that refuses to protect such rights where the child's
mother is married to another man.
16
Similarly, under Brennan's approach, the major cases of the
modern substantive due process revival were also correctly decided.
Thus, "we"-meaning the remaining members of the Warren-Burger
Court-have traditionally protected the liberty and freedom of
persons seeking medical procedures and making decisions about
when to start or expand families. Accordingly, that tradition is not
negatived, but instead violated, by state statutes criminalizing
abortion, and hence those statutes are unconstitutional, and Roe v.
Wade17 was decided correctly. Likewise, "we"-the relevant mem-
bers of the Court-have "traditionally" protected the "right to be left
alone," and again, that tradition is violated, not negatived, by the
existence of statutes criminalizing consensual sodomy. Therefore,
Bowers v. Hardwick1 8 was decided erroneously. To take a final
example, "we"-again the liberal members of the Court-have "tradi-
12 See id. at 2351.
13 See id. at 2350.
14 See id.
15 See id. at 2351-55.
16 See id. at 2355.
17 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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tionally" protected the right to bodily control and the right to
decide one's own medical fate; this tradition is violated, not
negatived, by the existence of statutes qualifying the "right to die"
with weighty evidentiary presumptions. Therefore, the Court was
right in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health1 9 to
articulate a basic right to die,20 and indeed the Court should have
gone further than it was willing to go in giving substance to that
right. Thus, the use of general rather than specific traditions,
grounded not in societal custom, but in the Warren and Burger
Courts' decisions that protected liberty, gives the formulation
considerably more breadth than Scalia's explicitly narrow and
conservative formulation.
In spite of the manifest differences between Justice Scalia's and
Justice Brennan's accounts, however, and the sharply differing
results to which those approaches lead, both positions-not just
Scalia's-are deeply conservative understandings of the due process
clause, for three reasons. First, and most obviously, both positions
define the liberty protected by the due process clause by reference
to some set of past historical traditions. The traditions on which
they depend are different: Scalia prefers to defer to societal or
communitarian tradition, whereas Brennan wants to rely on the
traditions identified in the judicial precedent from a particular era.
Both, nevertheless, define liberty in terms of past tradition rather
than, for example, by reference to some understanding of the
ideally free or autonomous individualist life.
SecondJustice Brennan, no less thanjustice Scalia, understands
the due process clause as a means by which we can "conserve" some
aspect of the past against the encroachments of contemporaneous
or future majoritarian or judicial power. Justice Scalia seeks to
protect, or conserve, the traditions, and particularly the moral
traditions, of the community against ill-advised, precipitous state
actions. Brennan, by contrast, seeks to protect, or conserve, the
traditions respected by a particular set of Supreme Court prece-
dents, as well as, perhaps, the "tradition" of precedent itself, against
future and contemporaneous Court betrayals of their underlying
principles. But both view liberty, and the due process clause that
protects it, as means of protecting not so much individual liberty for
its own sake, but individual liberty to participate in past traditions
'9 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
20 See id. at 2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1991] 1377
1378 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:1373
that are worthy of protection. To put the same point somewhat
differently, both are "backward looking" understandings of liberty
and of due process: they both define liberty by looking not at what
liberty is, as understood by liberal philosophical exegesis, political
oratory, or even linguistic analysis, but rather by examination of
what it has meant according to the traditions or customs of the past.
Lastly, bothJustices' approaches, Brennan's no less than Scalia's,
represent "communitarian" rather than "individualistic" understand-
ings of the meaning of liberty. NeitherJustice asks what the ideally
autonomous or liberated individual life demands or requires of the
state. Rather, both understand "liberty" as meaning essentially the
liberty to conform to traditions, though traditions variously and
differently understood. What is thus protected, at most, is the
liberty to obey or conform to the dictates of relevant traditions,
rather than the liberty to rebel against them, in the face of state or
majoritarian action seeking to deny that liberty. For this reason as
well, it is fair to characterize not only Scalia's approach, but
Brennan's as well, as conservative. In summary, both Justices seek
to protect and conserve the traditions of the past against contempo-
raneous or future change, both are backward looking in their
temporal orientation, and both are on their own terms anti-
individualist. They protect not the individual's right to be different,
idiosyncratic, iconoclastic, or rebellious, but rather the individual's
right to conform to tradition and obey its dictates.
Furthermore, the conservatism of Brennan's discussion of liberty
in Michael H. is not simply a peculiarity of that case. Rather, it
reflects the general tenor and much of the language of the liberal
Justices' understanding of substantive due process that has evolved
over the last twenty years. Indeed, virtually all of the recent
substantive due process cases hailed as great liberal victories-Roe v.
Wade, Griswold v. Connecticut,2 1 Eisenstadt v. Baird , 22 and the
recent Cruzan decision-are "conservative" in precisely the same
sense as is Brennan's opinion in Michael H. All of these cases define
liberty by reference to traditions which are themselves identified by
reference to the past; they are all "backward looking" rather than
forward looking in their orientation; and they all ultimately protect
the "liberty" of the individual to conform to established historical
traditions, rather than the iberty of the individual to rebel against
21 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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them. Thus, the liberty protected in Roe, Griswold, and Eisenstadt,
quite generally, is the "liberty" to participate in the traditionally
protected familial and marital decisions regarding reproduction and
is defended precisely on those grounds. 23 Similarly, the "liberty"
defended in Cruzan is the liberty to participate in the traditionally
protected realm of decisions regarding one's own medical treat-
ment.24 Likewise, the dissenters in Bowers rested their defense of
sexual liberty not on the value of sexual liberty per se, but on the
traditionally protected "right to be left alone."
25
Why is this? Why is it that the interpretation of liberty offered
by the liberal wing of the Court, not only in Brennan's expansive
discussion of the issue in Michael H., but also in the major modern
substantive due process cases generally, differs only marginally from
that offered by the conservative wing? The substantive due process
doctrine is surely susceptible to more interpretations than the
conservative interpretation it has received over the bulk of this
century. More importantly, the ideal of liberty is surely susceptible
to more and more progressive interpretations than either the
traditionalist or precedential accounts given by Scalia and Brennan
respectively. Specifically, there are at least two understandings of
"liberty" that differ dramatically from both Scalia's and Brennan's
accounts. Both of these understandings undoubtedly have played
a role in our political debates, political history, and political dreams.
Both could also-although to date they have not-played a role in
constitutional interpretation as well.
First, as liberal philosophers from John Locke26 to John
Rawls27 have argued, the content and meaning of "liberty" might
be properly derived not from historical tradition-whether com-
munitarian or precedential-but from an ideal conception of an
autonomous life. The content of that ideal is of course controver-
sial, but that does not mean that it is not ascertainable. A life may
not be ideally "autonomous," for example, without a guarantee of
23 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-56; Eisenstad 405 U.S. at 453-55; Griswold 381 U.S. at
485-86.
24 See 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52.
478 U.S. 186, 199-214 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).2
6 SeeJ. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 132 (T. Cook ed. 1947) ("The
natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be
under the will or legislative authority of man.... The liberty of man in society is to
be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the common-
wealth.").2 7 SeeJ. RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 202 (1971).
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employment, minimal sustenance, and shelter, as John Dewey
argued,28 or without a just distribution of resources, as Rawls has
argued.2 9 Likewise, a life may lack autonomy without some sphere
of privacy in which to conduct intimate affairs, without rights and
freedoms retained from the state of nature, or without some
amount of education. Whatever the merits of these arguments, they
share one feature: they derive the content of liberty not from
historical tradition, but from liberal ideals. Their validity depends
not on the presence or absence of "traditions" guaranteeing welfare
rights, privacy rights, education, or natural rights, but on the
ascertainable conditions of a truly autonomous life.
A second possible understanding of liberty comes not from
liberal philosophy but from radical politics and practice. "Liberty"
might be understood in a "liberationist," rather than a "libertarian"
sense. On this account, liberty requires liberation from any number
of pernicious constraints, whether imposed by the state, private
persons, or nature. This may include liberation from hunger, from
slavery, from poverty, from sexual abuse, from "the patriarchy," and
from racism itself. "Liberty," on this view, requires liberty from
bondage, whether that bondage be the result of state oppression,
state meddling, or private action.
Somewhat paradoxically, this "radical" interpretation of liberty
has the virtue of being at least somewhat reflective of the history of
the due process clause that protects it. The fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause might have meant originally that no one's
"liberty" may be taken by anyone, such as a slaveowner, other than
the state (and then only with due process). What due process
requires, in other words, is that the state and only the state may be
"sovereign" over the individual and her liberty. Correlatively, the
due process clause imposes on the state an obligation to prohibit
the "private sovereignty" effected by private relationships of
domination and subordination, such as that of enslavement. By
extension, then, in modern times the state may also have an
obligation, on this view of both "liberty" and "due process," to
prohibit the private sovereignties created by unchecked racism,
sexual violence, or homophobic violence as well. If the state fails to
28 SeeJ. DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 31 (Capricorn ed. 1963). See also
J. DEWEY, INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW 89 (1930).
2 SeeJ. RAWLS, supra note 27, at 204-05 (arguing that worth of liberty is adversely
affected by poverty, ignorance, or "lack of means generally").
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do so, it has deprived the individual of her liberty, without due
process.
Why, then, does "liberty" receive from even the liberal members
of the Court at best a broad interpretation and a defense grounded
in the conservative values of fidelity to the past, conformity to
traditions, the primacy of the community over the individual, and
respect for judicial precedent, rather than liberal commitments to
autonomy or radical commitments to liberation? The easiest, but
ultimately least satisfying explanation is that it is simply politics: it
may be that appearances notwithstanding, Justice Brennan and the
other liberals on the Court are in fact only marginally more liberal
than Justice Scalia and his fellow conservatives. If so, the similari-
ties between the two approaches might stem from their shared
conservative roots, just as their manifest differences might stem
from their obvious, but in the end superficial, political differenc-
es.30 There are, though, serious problems with this explanation.
First, appearances are dramatically to the contrary; Justice Brennan
is a modern liberal jurist if anyone is. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, neither Justice Brennan nor Justice Scalia, in Michael
H. or elsewhere, write as if politics alone dictated their different
legal conclusions. Rather, both write as though their understanding
of "the Law," and their understanding of the appropriate scope of
the judicial role, led them to their divergent formulations. It may
be worthwhile exploring other possible explanations which would
take seriously both their clear political differences as well as their
clearly stated legal and jurisprudential aspirations.
One possible alternative explanation, put forward with tremen-
dous force by Cass Sunstein in a series of articles on the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, is that the clause itself
is generally "backward looking" in its orientation and that it has
been from its inception.3 1 In sharp contrast to the equal protec-
tion clause-which is at least potentially progressive and "forward
looking"-the history of both the fifth and fourteenth amendments'
due process clauses fairly clearly direct the Court to traditional,
historical sources for ascertainment of the content of the liberty
30 Cf Grey, Eros, Civilization, and the Burger Cour, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
83 (1980) (arguing that need for social order, not respect for liberty, lies behind the
liberal Justices' willingness to grant constitutional protection to sexual freedom).
31 See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 912-17 (1987)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy]; Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the
Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1170-78 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Sexual Orientation].
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they protect.3 2 The equal protection clause is the source of, and
tool for, idealistic, progressive challenge to the status quo. In
contrast, the due process clause, like the takings and contracts
clauses, historically has been the tool of the conservative impulse to
preserve the liberties defined by the past and to protect against
overzealous, imprudent change.
It is no coincidence, following Sunstein's logic, that the Court
in Lochner v. New York 33 understood the liberty protected by the
due process clause as consisting of the liberty to enter contracts on
individually chosen terms, thereby preserving the status quo, free
from the redistributive and paternalist influences of reformist
workplace legislation. The broad mistake of the Lochner Court, then,
was to embrace a view of the entire Constitution as essentially
analogous to this conservative understanding of the due process
clause. The narrow mistake of the Court in Lochner itself, however,
simply for purposes of its due process jurisprudence, was not that it
understood due process conservatively, but that it viewed it as yet
another substantive limit on state action.
34
32 See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 31, at 884-86; Sunstein, Sexual
Orientation, supra note 31, at 1170-78.
33 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
34 Sunstein does not make this argument in any one place, but I would reconstruct
it from his suggestions in Sexual Orientation, supra note 32, and Lochner's Legacy,
supra note 32, as follows. The "liberty" that the individual possesses, and that is
protected by the fourteenth amendment, tends to be understood as incorporating a
"baseline" of common law origins. This, in turn, has the effect of constitutionally
protecting the given distribution of wealth and privilege against legislative change.
Generally, this reliance on unexamined baselines is misplaced. Overreliance on
improper "baselines" for constitutional decision-making, Sunstein would argue,
haunts not only due process interpretation, but several areas of constitutional law.
Because of this recurrent reliance on common law baselines, a legislature that upsets
the entitlements provided by the common law is viewed as having "acted," acted
"affirmatively," and acted affirmatively in a way which upsets pre-legal individual
liberties. On the other hand, a legislature that leaves those entitlements intact has
not acted, but it has respected liberty. Similarly, a law which redistributes such
entitlements is regarded as "redistributive," and hence a violation of liberty, of the
takings clause, and possibly of the contracts clause. For these reasons, such a law is
acting outside the scope of police power, whereas alaw that leaves those entitlements
intact is regarded as having respected liberty. A law which upsets these "natural"
entitlements is regarded as impermissibly biased, and a law that leaves them intact is
regarded as "neutral." This was also the underlying rationale of the major substantive
due process cases from the Lochner era.
The repudiation of Lochner, Sunstein argues, should be understood as a
repudiation of precisely this understanding of the exalted constitutional status of
common law entitlements, rather than a repudiation of judicial activism or an
affirmation of legislative supremacy. Common law entitlements may or may not be
entitled to constitutional protection; whether they are depends on the clause and the
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How, on this view, does one account for the recent "substantive
due process" decisions that appear to be liberal victories, such as
Roe or, arguably, Griswold? Although Sunstein has not addressed the
question directly, he has indirectly. According to Sunstein, among
others, the statutes involved in these cases, although determined to
be violations of the due process clause, properly should be under-
stood as violations of the equal protection clause instead . 5 What
is at stake in Roe, for example, is not "privacy" or "liberty," but the
subordination of women as a class through the imposition of laws
that have the effect of "turning women's reproductive capacities
into something for the use and control of others."3 6  And, the
equal protection clause easily can be understood as a constitutional
mandate to the states to avoid or to correct for precisely this kind
of subordination. Furthermore, that kind of subordination rests on
precisely the same conservative impulse as the Lochner decision
itself. Whereas the Lochner Court treated the common law as
providing the baseline against which intrusions upon liberty are
determined, the impulse to criminalize abortions treats "nature" as
context. In some spheres of constitutional decision-making, this reliance on the
common law as the baseline of constitutionally protected interests is entirely proper-
the contracts clause and the takings clause are two examples. But in a large number
of other contexts it is entirely inappropriate. It is inappropriate, for example, for us
to judge whether or not the state action requirement has been met by appeals to
hidden "baselines" of common law entitlements, such that if those baselines have
been violated, the state has acted, but if they have been maintained, there is no state
action. The repudiation of Lochner is a repudiation of this view that the existing
distribution of entitlements and wealth is a function of "nature" and hence an aspect
of our natural liberty. That distribution is a function, generally, of the common law-
very much a state, and governmental, creation.
Although Sunstein himself is not tremendously clear on the point, his
understanding of the repudiation of Lochner seems to teach this lesson regarding
substantive due process itself. To the considerable degree that the substantive due
process doctrine is dependent upon this conception of the common law as the
"baseline" for determining infringements on personal liberty, the doctrine in its
entirety-rather than just one possible interpretation of it, and certainly rather than
judicial activism per se-should be understood as undermined by the repudiation of
Lochner. Like the takings clause and the contracts clause, liberty under the due
process clause during the Lochner era was understood by reference to hidden
common law baselines establishing entitlements. But unlike the contracts or takings
clause, the "substantive due process" doctrine is, in its entirety, a mistake; further-
more, it is a dearly "repudiated" one. If substantive due process must mean what it
meant to the Lochner Court-that state redistribution of existing entitlements violates
liberty-then it should be abandoned, for that was the central message of Lochners
repudiation.
35 See C. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law, With Special Reference to
Abortion, Surrogacy, and Pornography (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
36 Id. at 43.
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providing such baselines. Therefore, the repudiation of Lochner, far
from undercutting the outcome in Roe, as argued by scores of the
case's critics, in fact mandates it, but for reasons utterly inconsistent
with those espoused in the decision itself. The repudiation of
Lochner, and of the substantive understanding of the due process
clause upon which it depends, far from implying that Roe is wrongly
decided, implies a repudiation of the use of the very sorts of
"baselines" which underlie the criminalization of abortion and,
hence, the subordination of women. The repudiation of Lochner
and of substantive due process, then, requires a reading of equal
protection-not of due process-that in turn justifies the outcome in
Roe.
The understanding of the fourteenth amendment that emerges
from this Sunsteinian view of due process and equal protection is
both neat and neatly schizophrenic: the equal protection clause is
"forward looking" while the due process clause is "backward
looking"; the equal protection clause uses ideals of equality and
non-subordination as a "baseline," while the due process clause uses
extant practices and distributions; the equal protection clause, in
essence, is progressive, while the due process clause is conservative.
The equal protection clause, then, protects against the very sorts of
"subordination" that the due process clause, under a substantive
interpretation, requires. If so, then the conservatism of interpreta-
tions of substantive due process, even by the liberals on the Court,
is not so mysterious. It simply reflects the historic conservatism of
the due process clause itself, and of the liberty it purports to
protect.
One further and closely related explanation of the conservatism
of due process adjudication has been suggested-more indirectly
than directly-by other progressive scholars of the due process
clause.s7 The conservatism of the interpretations of due process
rendered by even liberal Justices may be a function not so much of
the historical conservatism of the clause itself, but of the political
and moral conservatism of the ideal of liberty it is designed to
protect. From this perspective, liberty, not the due process clause,
accounts for the conservative tilt of the substantive due process
cases; individual liberty simply is a conservative ideal, and it is
37 See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 164-66 (1987) [hereinafter C.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE 159-70 (1989) [hereinafter C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY].
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therefore not surprising that even liberal interpretations of its
content reflect that fact. Promotion of individualist values and
individual freedom "frees up" private action that will inevitably
entail the subordination of weaker parties, whether the particular
"liberty" is physical, economic, sexual, or ideational.38 To be free
of state control means, in essence, to be free to subordinate others-
whether through one's superior economic strength manifested in
self-serving and exploitative contracts, superior physical force
facilitating physical or sexual oppression, or superior intellectual
clout and access facilitating cultural tyranny.
Implicit in this view is an unavoidable "trade-off" between
individual liberty and egalitarian ideals; protecting freedom or
liberty inevitably entails the reinforcement of hierarchy. Protecting
the individual's liberty to set contract terms further entrenches
economic hierarchy. Protecting the individual's liberty to utter
racially defamatory slurs further entrenches racial hierarchies.
Protecting the individual's liberty to do as he wishes within the
"privacy" of his own home, marriage, or family, perpetuates the
subordination of the women and children over which, as a conse-
quence of his protected liberty, he enjoys dominion. Individual
liberty necessarily implies the liberty to engage in private acts of
subordination. As we increase liberty, we threaten equality, and we
can only promote meaningful equality by curtailing, to some extent,
the individual liberty with which it is inevitably at war.
There is a great deal to be said for both of these explanations.
Both Sunstein's analysis of due process and the related critique of
liberty have the virtue of taking the due process liberty cases "at
face value." The reason for their conservative tilt, on both accounts,
stems from the content of the law itself, not from deep unobserv-
able psychological facts or impermissible political motivations. Both
explanations respect the boundaries, so to speak, of legal discourse.
They also both have the virtue of explaining not only the major
conservative due process decision of the century-Lochner-but also
the more subtle conservatism behind the Court's "liberal" modern
due process cases, from Griswold to Roe. There may also be
historical support for both positions. The progressive account of
liberty summarized above, for example, is echoed not only in
modern libertarian dogma, but also in the account of liberty
38 See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 37, at 164-66; C.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 37, at 163-70.
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espoused in The Federalist.3 9 And, as Sunstein has suggested, at
least some of the framers of the fifth amendment may indeed have
viewed the due process clause as an intrinsically conservative
doctrine, directing the focus of inquiry "backward" to the demands
of an established natural law tradition, rather than forward to the
demands of only vaguely conceived utopian ideals.
40
Both accounts, however, have real problems. First, the Sunstein-
ian claim that substantive due process is a conservative doctrine and
equal protection is progressive, even if historically supportable,
seems normatively and even linguistically indefensible. It is not at
all obvious that the guarantee that liberty will not be taken without
due process is intrinsically more conservative than the guarantee
that the state will provide equal protection of the laws. Nor is it at
all obvious that liberty itself, as a political ideal, is intrinsically more
conservative than the ideal of equality. As shown above, the ideal
of liberty as a restraint on state action can certainly be understood
in a liberal or radical sense, as well as in a conservative one. Purely
as a matter of political theory, to say nothing of political morality,
both positions are unappealing: they read into the fourteenth
amendment a peculiarly schizophrenic attitude toward social
change.
Second, whatever may have been the original intent of the
framers of the fifth amendment's liberty clause, the history as well
as the judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment cut
against Sunstein's claim that the equal protection clause and the due
process clause point in opposite political directions. Although the
equal protection clause is surely susceptible to progressive interpre-
tations, with only occasional exceptions, 4 1 it has been interpreted
by the Court for the most part narrowly and formally and with
profoundly conservative consequences. 4 2  Just as "liberty" has
received a predominantly conservative and traditionalist gloss, so
39 See THE FEDERALiST No. 10 (J. Madison).
40 See Sunstein, Sexual Orientation, supra note 31, at 1171.
41 The most notable exception, of course, is Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1954).
42 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (increasing
evidentiary burden on minorities to show violation of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause by requiringspecific proof ofpast discrimination); University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (restricting affirmative action by limiting
consideration of race in admissions decisions); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (reducing evidence available to minorities sufficient to prove discrimination
by finding that disproportionate effects alone do not warrant conclusion of
purposeful discrimination).
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equal protection has typically been interpreted as requiring a formal
rather than substantive equality that has itself become an obstacle
of, rather than a vehicle for, progressive movements toward racial
or sexual justice. Sunstein sees, or perhaps wants to see, in the
fourteenth amendment a "division of labor": due process and
liberty as a vehicle for conserving the past against precipitous
change, and equal protection as a vehicle for progressive challenges
to the status quo. Whatever may have been the case at the
amendment's inception, this theory has not been borne out by
subsequent judicial implementation.
More to the point, from a progressive perspective, both of these
arguments seem unwise. They concede far too much, and for no
obvious reason. Even if it is true that the major judicial interpreta-
tions of substantive due process during the course of this century
have been overwhelmingly conservative, it may not be because of
the inherent conservatism of either the constitutional mandate of
due process or the moral or political ideal of "liberty." If not, then
progressives give away too much by conceding interpretive power
over the moral and constitutional ideal embedded in the due
process clause and the liberty it protects to conservative rhetoric
and ideology. For surely either the liberal, autonomy-promoting
understanding of liberty or the radical liberationist conception could
have informed the Court's substantive due process analysis of the
last twenty years. It seems fair to say, though, that neither has, at
least not in any clear or sustained fashion.
To take just one example, the "liberty" protected by the
reproductive "rights" enunciated in Roe can be understood in either
of the two senses sketched above. Reproductive choice may be
essential for an autonomous life, and "liberation from" the spectre
of unwanted pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood may be an
accurate understanding politically of what the "pro-choice" political
and liberationist movement is all about. It is not necessary, in other
words, to reconceive the progressive substantive due process
decisions as "equal protection" cases in disguise, in order to reach
the same outcome while avoiding libertarian or traditionalist
understandings of the liberty which due process protects. The ideal
of liberty is susceptible to multiple interpretations. Rather than
reconceptualize progressive liberty cases as true equality cases-on
the premise that either liberty, due process, or both are intrinsically
conservative, and hence in a deep sense inconsistent with progres-
sive outcomes-we might more profitably reconceptualize the ideal
of liberty itself.
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One alternative explanation of the conservatism which inheres
in the purportedly liberal interpretation of the liberty protected by
the due process clause is thatJustice Brennan and the other liberals
on the Court, no less and no more than Justice Scalia, try in their
judging to be true to ideals of "good" judging. They therefore
interpret the due process clause in such a way as to promote, or to
be true to, a range of "adjudicative virtues." And it is those virtues-
not the constitutional ideal of "liberty"-that are themselves
inherently conservative. It is good judicial decision-making, rather
than any part of the Constitution, that is (and should be) sensitive
to historical tradition, custom, and precedents; that is "backward
looking" rather than "forward looking" in its aspiration to cohere
with past patterns of law; and that is communitarian rather than
individualist in its respect for the mandates of "ordered liberty." If
that is right, then it would not be surprising that even comparatively
"liberal" interpretations of constitutional phrases, which are
themselves a part of adjudicative discourse and which accordingly
aim for adjudicative virtue, will not be as liberal as liberal in-
terpretations of the same phrase found in other discursive contexts.
Indeed, if we take Justice Brennan's decisions at face value, it
seems fair to say that his broad precedential approach to liberty, no
less than Justice Scalia's narrowly traditionalist account, is heavily
and explicitly constrained by his sense of the requirements of an
ideal of good-meaning moral-judicial decision-making. The
difference, then, between Brennan and Scalia's approaches is a
function not (only) of simple politics, but of the differences between
the particular conception of the ideal judicial decision and, hence,
the particular adjudicative virtue harbored by each Justice. Thus,
Scalia's narrow understanding of liberty and the due process that
protects it is an explicit attempt to minimize the potential for
arbitrary judicial decision-making that runs counter to the dictates
of democratic desire. Insistence on narrow rather than broad
understandings of the general clauses of the Constitution, in Scalia's
mind, is the surest way to protect against not only arbitrary or
whimsical decisions, but also against the judicial tyranny of judges
acting as super-legislators in pursuit of their own political values
rather than justice. Brennan's comparatively liberal or broader
understanding of "tradition" is unquestionably driven in part by a
very different political morality, but the conservatism of his approach,
compared with non-judicial liberal interpretations, may best be
explained by its jurisprudential motivation. Brennan's reliance on
precedentially identified traditions to fill in the content of "liberty"
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can perhaps best be understood as an attempt to protect the
"integrity" and "consistency" of the considerably more liberal body
of case law in which the Warren and Burger Courts broadly
construed the clause in question. Integrity and consistency, no less
than the avoidance of arbitrary, whimsical or tyrannical decisions,
are obviously adjudicative virtues. And like those virtues, they are
themselves "conservative"; they counsel for decisions that cohere
with patterns of principles that speak to us from the past.
If this is all or even part of the story, then the conservatism of
the due process clause derives at least in part from the fact that the
Constitution receives its meaning almost entirely from judges acting
under the intrinsically conservative duties imposed upon them by
virtue of their judicial role, and it is not a function of the inherent
or historical association of the clause with conservative political
ideals. This hypothesis-that the conservatism of even the liberal
Justices' liberty jurisprudence is in part a function of ethical
constraints regarding the nature of moral judicial decisionmaking-
explains at least one puzzle: it is for this reason that judicial
understandings of liberty authored by the liberal judges are so much
more conservative than interpretations of "liberty" suggested by
liberal political theorists or liberal political activists. For indeed, it
seems to be only judges who are wedded to the peculiar idea that
the content of liberty should be and has been derived from past
communitarian or precedential traditions. As discussed above,
liberal political philosophers and political activists think of liberty
in any number of ways,43 but virtually none of them harken back
to tradition, either the conservative traditions of a society or the
traditions identified as essential to liberty by a liberal Supreme
Court. If the conservatism of due process interpretation is due to
a quest for adjudicative virtues which are themselves conservative,
then it is not surprising that judicial interpretations of liberty are so
much more conservative than political interpretations of the same
ideal in non-legal discourses. If judges are heavily influenced by
ethical imperatives of decision-making that are peculiar to adjudica-
tion, then it is not surprising that they have developed a set of
definitions of "liberty" that also seem peculiar to adjudication.
Those definitions owe as much to the ethical demands placed upon
judges as they do to the text of the Constitution, its history, or the
political will of its interpreters.
43 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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What this implies is simply that if we follow the suggestion of
the growing number of commentators-neo-civic-republican and
otherwise-arguing for an end to the monopolization by the Court
of constitutional interpretation, then we should expect to see a far
wider range of interpretations of the "liberty" which the state must
respect, nurture, or "leave alone" than that represented by the
Scalia-Brennan poles of debate in Michael H. v. Gerald D. Freed of
the constraints of the panoply of demands imposed by the adjudica-
tive virtues-the various needs to write narrow decisions, to respect
the rights of similarly situated persons, to adhere to the patterns
established by past decisions-constitutional interpreters, whether
citizens, legislators, or commentators, may see any number of
potential meanings in the due process clause to which the Court, by
virtue of its identity as a court, is blind. It may be, for example,
that liberty is impossible in the face of chronic homelessness,
joblessness, or hunger and that this fact should operate as a
constitutional constraint on what the state may refuse to do, as well
as what the state may do. It may also be that liberty is impossible
in the face of stultifying, demoralizing, constant, private oppression
and that this fact as well should constrain constitutionally what the
state may neglect as well as what it may do. The due process clause
may grant us, in other words, both "affirmative" liberty rights and
rights to be free of private -oppression. Non-judicial constitutional
interpreters, freed of the constraints of judicial ethics, may find
these arguments more persuasive than virtually any court would, not
only as the conservative Rehnquist Court would.
The modern Court, of course, has held to the contrary: it has
ruled consistently that liberty does not embrace affirmative welfare
rights and that the fourteenth amendment does not reach private
action. Whether they were right or wrong in doing so is not the
argument of this paper. All I want to suggest is that they have
reached these conservative interpretations in large part because they
are a court. Should other interpreters enter the debate-should
Congress, for example, accept its section five burden of passing
legislation for the purpose of enforcing the liberty guarantee of the
fourteenth amendment-they may see very different and much
broader meanings in the general phrases of the amendment than
the Court has seen to date. Congress is not burdened by the ethical
imperative to write decisions that are consistent with decisions that
have gone before. It is not burdened with the need to treat like
cases alike. Nor is it charged with the task of "conserving" the
societal traditions of the past. It has no reason to interpret liberty
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in such a way as to maintain a "seamless web" of precedent. It is
charged with the task of enforcing the mandate of the fourteenth
amendment, and it is generally charged with the work of distribut-
ing resources in a just manner. It is not asking too much, then, to
expect Congress to do its distributive and redistributive work in a
way which promotes rather than impedes or frustrates true
individual "liberty"-understood not as societal tradition and not as
judicial precedent, but as the necessary societal conditions for a
genuinely free, autonomous life.

